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Abstract
The relationship between modern philosophy and physics is discussed. It is
shown that the latter develops some need for a modernized metaphysics which
shows up as an ultima philosophia of considerable heuristic value, rather than as
the prima philosophia in the Aristotelian sense as it had been intended, in the first
place. It is shown then, that it is the philosophy of Spinoza in fact, that can still
serve as a paradigm for such an approach. In particular, Spinoza’s concept of in-
finite substance is compared with the philosophical implications of the foundatio-
nal aspects of modern physical theory. Various connotations of substance are
discussed within pre-geometric theories, especially with a view to the role of spin
networks within quantum gravity. It is found to be useful to introduce a separati-
on into physics then, so as to differ between foundational and empirical theories,
respectively. This leads to a straightforward connection between foundational
theories and speculative philosophy on the one hand, and between empirical theo-
ries and sceptical philosophy on the other. This might help in the end, to clarify
some recent problems, such as the absence of time and causality at a fundamental
level. It is implied that recent results relating to topos theory might open the way
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2towards eventually deriving logic from physics, and also towards a possible tran-
sition from logic to hermeneutic.
1   Philosophy and Science Today
The main task of humans is to model nature. To be more precise, they model their
surrounding environment, and they model themselves within that environment.
This serves as a guideline for orientation within a complex world and gives them
conceptions of how to actually deal with this world in practise. From what they
have found out about the environment in their immediate vicinity, they infer re-
sults about phenomena and things which are far away (both in spatial and tempo-
ral terms, respectively). The idea is to generalize the results as far as possible;
this stabilizes experience in terms of the modelling done. Stable (in fact, structu-
rally stable) aspects of nature can be taught to others, because in that case the
models achieved imply general rules and a systematic approach to nature which
can be communicated easily. In principle then, teaching is „saving experience“ (if
only for relatively simple things such as the sciences).
At the same time, humans are also a product of nature. That is, they have emer-
ged from the same process they are trying to model, in first place. By having been
produced, they now interact with nature in order to actively modify it according
to their objectives. They are participators rather than mere observers. In so far as
they are nature’s product, their modifying of nature is still the same process re-
presenting nature’s activity. Hence, in principle, nature is actually modifying itself
by means of human (research) activities.
Obviously, the various fields of scientific activity are divided according to the
„regional“ aspects nature is displaying for the various perspectives of systematic
interest. The division of labour is also applied to „research labour“ in the sense
that it reduces the observed complexity of the world. In fact, thinking itself is
deeply rooted in this permanent activity of reducing complexity (which could be
used as another formula for expressing the modelling activity of humans). Hu-
mans think in a „digital“ rather than analogous way, that is they artificially intro-
duce sections and intervals, or distances into the process they actually observe,
they „sequentialize“ this process, which remains however all the time quite an
analogous (continuous) process, if viewed in terms of perception (even if its
structure is highly non-linear). On the other hand, modern physics tends to show
that space is intrinsically digitalized in a way, and so might be time (if it is not
absent altogether). And this result would not come as a surprise, in fact, because
of humans being a product of nature, leading to the conclusion that their models
of nature become more adapted to their (natural) mode of thinking in the long run.
Hence, the contradiction between continuous and discrete structures of the world
3(leading to different concepts of process) has always been very much in the cen-
tre of discussion. Although the modelling performed introduces a level of ab-
straction into nature which apparently leads away from concrete, practical nature,
it is nevertheless nearer to reality in the sense that humans may learn to differen-
tiate between how the world appears to be (in its modality) and how it may be in
reality. In other words, humans perceive the world according to their biological
constitution which is an outcome of the process of nature. And this constitution
comprises e.g. of temporality. But these means of perception opening up the way
to cognitively grasp the world, are aimed towards optimizing orientation within
the world (for finding enough food and being sufficiently protected in the first
place). There is no reason to believe that there is any necessity involved in a fit-
ting of these perceptive capacities to the actual uncovering of the real structure of
the world. Without doubt, there is some real world of which humans are a part,
and obviously, it can be mapped adequately in one way or the other, but this does
not tell us any kind of absolute truth about the being of the world. In a sense, the
speculative abilities of humans can be visualized as a kind of excess knowledge
achieved (probably because the impetus of striving for insight has a kind of dy-
namical space of free play which within the field of its anticipations opens up
considerably more possibilities than are actually needed for the time being.) The
topics of speculation however, as well as the topics of empirical research have
not really changed, because, given the human relation to environment, the choice
is probably limited.
The traditional division of scientific subjects, having actually been developed by
stoic philosophers for the first time (within European thought) in all generality,
has remained essentially invariant until today, though the terminology and the
conceptual attitude might have changed considerably. In this sense, physics is
dealing with the modelling of nature, logic with the modelling of thinking about
(modelling) nature, and hermeneutic with the modelling of thinking about thin-
king. (I do impose here a mild reductionism in using epistemological core catego-
ries rather than fields of research. In this sense, the sciences are reducible to phy-
sics such that the latter is included in them as a special case at their basic founda-
tions. But higher levels of complexity are irreducible to physics in the sense that
by passing down the hierarchy, emergent properties are effectively being lost.4)
And we can say something more about this: Because of humans being a product
of nature, their models of nature must necessarily contain self-models. In fact, it
may be possible to formulate (and prove) a simple proposition stating that each
model of nature contains at least one self-model.5
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 This is an almost trivial point which coincides with the traditional view of what is generally called „dialectic
materialism.“ Unfortunately, in ongoing debates, „reductionsm“ is mostly visualized instead in terms of „me-
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 This is in fact an almost trivial proposition again. I have explained this in more detail in my paper „Ordnung
und Unordnung - Zum neueren Determinismusstreit zwischen Thom und Prigogine“, Lendemains 50, Berlin,
4So we may come to the conclusion that all this modelling going on is primarily
one of a unified character, because it is dealing with a unified whole, a totality
which cannot actually be broken up into parts, if not accepting that important in-
formation will be lost then. On the other hand, because of practical reasons, it is
not possible to model everything at the same time. Hence, humans have to take
into account both these aspects: They have to study the minute details of nature,
but they have also to think about the interactive pattern which is constituting na-
ture’s totality, of which they are actually a part themselves. For the one task they
do have the sciences which deal with a fragment of nature only, according to the
definitions of their „regional competence“, for which they are designed in first
place, and according to their prescribed boundaries (which are sometimes rather
fluid nowadays). The problem with this approach is that very often, research in
one field is not at all related to (or even knows of) research in another so that the
interrelationship of these fragments forming a whole is more or less lost. That is
why philosophy takes the other perspective and centres around the aspect of tota-
lity. But in doing that, nowadays, philosophy has developed as a science of scien-
ces, or as a science of totality, following up the scientific results given at a time,
rather than trying to lay the grounds for science, as it has been the tradition for a
long time. Contrary to what was intended by the Aristotelian idea of „prima phi-
losophia“, philosophy is now putting forward research of a more conceptual and
heuristic kind.6
What we will do in the following is to recall basic aspects of Spinoza’s concept
of infinite substance (section II) in order to illustrate one of the chief origins of
the view presented here. The concept of substance proper is discussed then in
more detail, as a paradigm for basic ideas which are still relevant for us today
(section III). Recent foundational developments in physics are shortly summari-
zed, and their relationship to philosophical connotations of substance metaphysics
is shown, with a special stress being laid upon pre-geometric aspects of emer-
gence (section IV). Topos-theoretic consequences are discussed then (section V),
which might open the perspective towards an explicit derivation of logic from
physics (with obvious materialistic implications). Preliminary conclusions are fi-
nally drawn (section VI) as to a possible transgression of these results towards a
transition from logic to hermeneutic.
As might be appropriate for an essentially interdisciplinary „joint venture“, both
the philosophical sections (II, III), and the physical and mathematical sections
(IV, V), have been written on what the author thought would be a medium level
of technicality. Hence, the former are composed in a somewhat abstract, but at
the same time basically narrative language. The latter shortly summarize the tech-
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5nical aspects being accompanied by passages of philosophical commentary. The
important point is to be able to re-locate the relevant aspects of the former in the
latter, and also viceversa, and to make possible an interdisciplinary „cross-
reading“. As this is not very easy to achieve, some detailed explanations of a
conceptual nature have been included in this paper, which also accounts for its
length.
2   Spinoza Revisited
Basically, all of this is not really a new idea: It was already Spinoza in fact, who
had thought about these aspects in systematic detail. (Although this line of
thought can also be found much earlier in stoic philosophy, as mentioned above.)
As I have shown at another place7, for a long time, the consequent resumption
and continuation of the stoic line was obstructed due to ideological reasons, espe-
cially with a view to the dynamical aspects of nature primarily based on an active
sort of „creative matter“ leading forward to the possibility of a field concept with
regard to physical forces. Ironically however, it was exactly this sort of negative
approach which - as a kind of by-product - made it possible to gain more insight
into the relationship between the world and its foundation in the long run, because
the contradictions encountered sooner or later did not leave another way out than
just the resumption of the stoic line. The permanent spinning around the relati-
onship between God and world ended soon in blind alleys and on wrong tracks.
Their by-passing in terms of modern (Renaissance) mathematics opened up an
alternative approach with a two-fold result: On the one hand, the ancient concept
of substance was re-formulated in an abstract way, in explicitly denying its exi-
stence in the traditional, scholastic sense, thus re-introducing it as a concept in
terms of a productive misunderstanding and in a somewhat clandestine way. On
the other hand, the progressing detachment of philosophy from theology opened
up a new way to all aspects of nature which had been suppressed before: such as
the dynamics of self-creative and self-organizing matter as substratum and poten-
tial of an unfolding nature, including a re-definition of the organizational hierar-
chy of the universe, and of the mediation of matter with its explicit forms up to its
social forms constituting human systems, themselves dealing with the reflexion of
this very process, being subjected however to incomplete information. So it was
left to Spinoza to actually draw all these aspects (which were drifting apart for
quite a while) together again and to re-base them onto a sound foundation of stoic
systematics, at the same time giving a modern terminology to it which is still rele-
vant for us today.
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 The Klymene Principle, ch.II. - As far as Spinoza is concerned, I partly follow the outline of my argument
given there.
6But we should note the following: Spinoza does not only cumulate the various
strings of the philosophy of his time. He also visualizes philosophy as something
which is practically identical with ethics. For him, philosophy is a theory of the
conditions according to which human life is being defined. And this definition can
only be rational, if it is succeeding with respect to an ethical frame of references.
Ethics itself, unfolds the conditions according to which the human striving can be
realized. Humans are capable in this sense, of finding and conserving their own
mode of being, if they act according to adequate knowledge. Hence, there is a
close connection between freedom and insight. It is necessary therefore, to find
adequate ways (inveniri) in an appropriate project which is to be designed by hu-
mans themselves. If Spinoza’s „Ethics“ (1p34)8 states that the power of God is
his own essence (Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia), then, for humans, one
could add in an existential sense that the power of humans is their own existence
(Humani potentia est ipsa ipsius existentia). And the adequate form of this exi-
stence is being prescribed in terms of the virtue which leads forward to blissful
happiness. For humans therefore, virtue in this sense and power, are identical.
(4d8)9 Not only is this a mere re-formulation of stoic ideas, but Spinoza also tries
to define substance (God = nature) as causa immanens of the world, but in terms
of a twofold perspective taken according to whether the relationship between
God and world is visualized under the substantial (real) perspective of God him-
self, or under the modal perspective of humans who represent a finite mode of
what worldly exists. Obviously, the former perspective can be taken in speculati-
ve terms only, but because God represents himself completely in each of his attri-
butes, it is possible that humans can grasp his (substance’s) existence in principle,
provided they have developed the adequate knowledge about this due to their
adequate reflexion. In this sense, everything is in God (quicquid est, in Deo est),
but the viceversa is also true.
On the other hand, reflexion itself is an outcome of the organization of substance:
The constitution of the latter according to which it is productive with respect to
the field of modi, is its organization in terms of attributes.10 This means that God
does not really produce attributes, but he (as substance) is attributively organized
instead. Hence, God is causa sui only in so far as he produces everything what
there is, but this is only true with respect to the finite perspective of humans. Ne-
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7vertheless, a finite mode is in God, because it is a created mode within the totality
of nature. But in this mode as its cause, it is only God who acts as immanent cau-
se of permanency, it is not the totality of nature which is acting as this cause.11
Hence, the central position of nature which is classified by Spinoza in a twofold
way according to the classification given earlier by Averroes: He actually differs
between natura naturans (the actively creating nature producing things) and na-
tura naturata (the passively produced nature which is the outcome of processes
performed by natura naturans). The former represents the productivity of God, the
latter its result. Nature is the form of mediation in which God acts upon the
world as seen (and interpreted) under the modal perspective of humans. But in
reality, he does not think himself, because it is only the humans who do. (2a2)
And therefore, he is not a spirit either.12 So nature has an important role to play
within the frame of references which constitutes the world. But as it is only hu-
mans that think, the basic concept of worldly orientation is intersubjectivity in
first place, nature only in second. It is reflexion, and it is the political form of
communication that determine adequate knowledge. But the latter can only be
achieved, if the structure of the world in terms of its nature is uncovered and logi-
cally displayed. Hence, to study nature means to lay the ground for adequate
knowledge, and in the end, for adequate action according to ethical principles.
And this is a holistic viewpoint indeed.
Spinoza follows in this sense the Cartesian approach of deducing physics from
metaphysics.13 But he is far more radical than Descartes. Gabriel Albiac has ex-
pressed this clearly: „... nothing happens in Nature ... The conclusion imposes
itself. It is only within the framework of a general theory of Nature that there will
be room to understand all things (human or other) that it contains. (Hence) ... the
Ethics ... is a physics, which is a metaphysics.“14 Spinoza himself mentions this
aspect in a letter to Blijenbergh when he speaks of: „ ... Ethics, which, as every-
one knows, must be founded on metaphysics and physics ...“15 He seeks to derive
his ethical theory from this basic understanding of nature in first place, the psy-
chology of humans showing up within this framework as human nature, a parti-
cular case of nature in general. In this sense, every human action must be concei-
ved as a manifestation of nature.16
Note that this is the celebrated aspect of determinism in Spinoza, though not as
we know it: Instead of „determinism“ it would be more adequate to speak of „ne-
cessitarianism“, because nature is actually determining behaviour, but in an in-
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8trinsically contingent way. Hence, there is always a sufficient reason for eve-
rything which happens, and a kind of causal closure (consistency), but there is not
necessarily a fixed „program“ of processes. (We actually would argue today that
physics is determining all processes in the world, but very much in terms of a
basic framework, of some arena for processes. So having found out that in the
end, „everything is physics“, is certainly a true result and statement, but it is also
completely unsatisfactory without having done the hard work - namely re-
constructing the various levels of the hierarchy of complexity and following up
the lines of mediation towards the phenomena actually being observed.)
This has a decisive consequence for praxis visualized as human existence: For
Spinoza, the striving for conserving the own being (conatus in suo esse perseve-
randi), this characteristic kind of eigen-being, can be interpreted in terms of an
ethics which unfolds the conditions under which this striving can actually be rea-
lized. Under them, therefore, the individual human being can indeed arrive at its
own being (eigen-being).17 Provided he/she applies what Spinoza calls the true
method consisting of „the knowledge alone of the pure understanding, of its na-
ture and of its laws. To acquire this method, you must first of all distinguish bet-
ween intellect and imagination, or between true ideas and the others, that is ficti-
tious, / false and doubtful ideas, and, absolutely speaking, all those that depend
on memory alone.“18
Hence, this is the kind of „ideal of a unified science“19 Spinoza is aiming at. In
principle, he seeks primarily to improve the character of human beings by impro-
ving their self-understanding. And he justifies this with the argument that it would
bring humans the ultimate peace of mind as integral aspects of nature. Garrett
notes that Spinoza, very much like Hobbes, conceives of human beings as „me-
chanisms in nature“ that are motivated by self-preservation and individual
advantage. They can improve their way of life by the mutual employment of
reason. Hobbes however, tries to show how humans can optimize the chances for
a good life by instituting political constraints on their passions. Spinoza’s aim is
far more ambitious: He sets out to show how humans can achieve a way of life
that largely transcends the mere transitory desires leading to an autonomous con-
trol over passions.20
It is in this way that Spinoza’s monistic and naturalistic system speaks „most co-
gently and persuasively to the twentieth century.“21 In fact, it is doing so by ex-
plicating three basic aspects which have become very important for modern rese-
arch in recent times: visualizing a transcendental materialism with physics „at the
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9bottom“, in a radical approach to interdisciplinarity, and aiming at mediations
leading up to ethics and politics.
As far as physics is concerned Spinoza writes to Tschirnhaus:
By physics I understand nothing else than the science of the universe demonstrated a priori by
the rigorous method of the mathematicians and confirmed a posteriori by the most evident ex-
periences which even convince the imagination ... This science is truly divine. One here expo-
ses the laws ... according to which everything produces invariably its effects. The knowledge of
this science liberates us also of innumerable prejudices ... In this way, through the mediation of
the true physics, one becomes so to say a completely new man and one is regenerated philo-
sophically. ... Ultimately thanks to physics we are prepared for still more important knowled-
ge.22
Hence, the program of the „Ethics“ is one which confirms our view today as we
have introduced it in the beginning: the first point being to know our nature as
good as possible, desiring to perfect it, and the second to know as much of the
nature of things as is necessary.23
However, the radical kind of interdisciplinary approach is also very much on our
modern line: Spinoza’s necessitarianism (being based on a firm view of ontologi-
cal monism) leads him to abolish the classical divisions (of prudentiae and scien-
tiae) „making the principal subjects of the Ethics and the two political Treatises
formal impossibilities within a Peripatetic perspective.“24 This is what Negri ac-
tually means when speaking of Spinoza as „anomaly“: „Spinoza is the anomaly.
The fact that Spinoza, atheist and damned, does not end up behind bars or burned
at the stake, ... can only mean that his metaphysics effectively represents the pole
of an antagonistic relationship of force that is already solidly established: The de-
velopment of productive forces and relations of production in seventeenth-century
Holland already comprehends the tendency toward an antagonistic future.“25 In
his striving for an experientia sive praxis26, Spinoza aims at a theory of the
world, beginning with physics, ending up with social systems, proposing educa-
tional means of eventually approaching a state which, in an equilibrium of the in-
dividual and the institution, harmonizes human spirit in order to let it participate
in the larger harmony which is expressed in the material attribute of godly sub-
stance. This is obviously the reason for the recent reception of Spinoza’s in expli-
citly Marxist terms (notably in Althusser). It is Tosel who recognizes an ethico-
political consequence emerging from Spinoza’s approach, basing it on definite
materialistic philosophemes and a collection of motives generic for Marxist theo-
ry: „L’onto-théologie est éthico-politique: Dieu, c’est-à-dire la légalité d’une
Nature immanente, se traduit humainement dans l’immanence d’une société ratio-
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nellement réglée d’hommes capables de penser et agir. Et l’éthico-politique est à
son tour ontologique: l’homme libre est une possibilité de la nature anonyme.“27
He lists then a number of appropriate philosophemes: Nothing comes from noth-
ing(ness) - ex nihilo nihil fit -, everything has a reason which can be illuminated
by its foundation in terms of possibility, the real has objectivity which can be il-
luminated by science, hence, philosophy is also scientific and deals with the fun-
damental structures of what there is, dealing also with itself, in order to produce
knowledge about itself and about human thinking, hence philosophy-science de-
termines itself as a science of humans, being based on the fundamental thesis that
humans are themselves nature, not an empire within an empire, this science of
humans is scientific ethics, that is re-organization and re-orientation of human
life.28 In this sense, Tosel shows that for Spinoza, all of reality emerges from
another reality which is basically material, the unity of which is immanent in the
variety, and coincides with its own space of productivity. Hence, cosmology,
physics, and logic are the basic fields for constituting anthropology.29 The results
following immediately from this are exactly the topics which are our interest to-
day when trying to find a new synthesis of philosophy, science, arts, and praxis
(of which the first three are a part). And we can realize the strong existentialistic
connotation being handed down to us from Spinoza: Because of the elements just
mentioned, philosophy has a fundamental interest in liberating humans, in aiming
to a positive liberty of individuals against all kinds of heteronomy. Philosophy is
theory and praxis of autonomy. And in being a science of humans, philosophy is
also an instrument of critique, especially of critisizing all authorities which do not
base their principles on communicative arguments. Research about life is therefo-
re research of (and about) free life in the first place, of a life which has no other
generic principle than its physico-psychic unity. For this, nature is the original
reality, and as such nature is intelligible, and it is anterior to all thinking.30
3   The Principles of Substance
In order to clarify the concept of substance, it might be the best to look for its re-
lation to the fundamental categories of space and time in more detail: Essentially,
the attribute of extension can be visualized as space itself.31 The actual difference
between Leibniz and Spinoza can be phrased then in terms of the relationship
between objects and space. The former explains away the region and stays with
the relations among bodies, taking the region as an alternative way of expressing
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facts about them. The latter explains away the objects and stays with the region.
In referring to a famous example, Bennett formulates: „If there is (...) a pebble in
region R, what makes this true is the fact that R is pebbly (which) stands for a
certain monadic property that a spatial region / can have. If the pebble moves
(...), what makes this true is the fact that there is a continuous change in which
regions are pebbly: The so-called movement of a pebble through space is like the
so-called movement of a panic through a crowd.“32 Note that this gives a relati-
vely clear explanation of how we should visualize motion-in-itself. In this sense,
time does not remain as a fundamental category. Spinoza states in his 12th letter
that „ ... tempus (is) nothing but a mode of the imagination which ought to mean
that in a true fundamental account of the whole of reality th(is) concept ... would
not be used. (Hence,) all our measures - of time and space and of things spatial
and temporal - are superficial and „imaginative“, and not part of the basic, objec-
tive story.“33
Although this concept is widely agreed upon, at the same time, it has been the
target of many discussions. It can be shown however that Spinoza ties time to the
imagination (2p44s), basically referring it to human perceptions of varying mo-
tions of bodies.34 Hence, temporality actually emerges in the transition from infi-
nity to finite modes (of thinking) as laid down in 2p8 and its corollary.35 In fact,
as Bartuschat mentions explicitly in his discussion at this point, the corollary has
the important function of marking the transition to finite modes, and it is here
where Spinoza actually changes the perspective of description in his „Ethics“.36
Obviously, if temporality is part of the human world view in modal terms, then
there is no problem of determinism. But still, the question is as to the actual
structure of the human mode of being which is also the human mode of percepti-
on. Of course, Spinoza’s identity theorem (2p7) is the main topic around which
this question centres. If „thought is co-extensive with materiality“37, then the ethi-
cal implications of Spinoza rest basically on the fact that human thinking is not a
mere passive reflexion of the body’s vicissitudes: „As well as being mapped onto
a segment of the material world, the mind is inserted into the totality of
thought.“38 Hence, a singular individual is not a self which also strives for some-
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thing, but a singular individual is a self-in-striving, and it has a project structure
(very much in the sense of modern existential philosophy). But this project which
in the end shows up as the dynamical core of existence, is a representation of the
human’s finite mode of being, which points toward the adequate form of know-
ledge humans can have, because it is this knowledge in which they actually con-
serve their own being. And the generic form of realizing existence is acting ac-
cording to the results of adequate reflexion.39
Hence, human reflexion means nothing else but explicating the symbolic traces in
existence which intrinsically point to the true mediation of what there is with sub-
stance, visualized in terms of the latter’s attributes. Modelling the world in human
terms means modelling the configuration of (worldly) attributes. Obviously, the
latter cannot be modelled without modelling its foundation (substance) at the sa-
me time. This is the point where sceptical philosophy is clearly based and depen-
dent on speculative philosophy. In fact, human reflexion has the actual task of
organizing the infinite40 by means of the finite. And both of them are „knotted to
each other“ in terms of the consequences of the identity theorem 2p7: „Mental
items can be mapped onto bodily items in a way that preserves causal connected-
ness.“41 Hence, if M is the category of mental states, and B is the category of bo-
dily states, respectively, then there is a functor ϕ: B → M (preserving identities
and compositions). If so, probably, we could expect that the diagram
M1 → M2
↑        ↑
B1 →  B2
commutes, for any pair of bodily states, and mental states, respectively, when the
horizontally parallel arrows → refer to morphisms in the respective categories,
and the vertically parallel arrows ↑ define generic „liftings“. (In fact, one would
expect appropriate isomorphies to hold here.)42 These relationships secure that
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humans are capable at all to adequately interpret the symbolic traces intrinsic to
the world they observe. And this is the reason why speculative philosophy is not
only a necessary action to be undertaken, but also one which might result in suffi-
cient insight.
As to the semiological re-construction of these symbolic traces, Deleuze43 has
given a classification of signs which are relevant for the understanding of this
mediative structure of the world according to Spinoza. He introduces four prin-
ciple types of scalar signs, and two of vectorial signs, in the following manner:
Scalar signs are of indicative type according to whether they deal with sensory or
perceptive physical effects, indicating human nature rather than anything else, of
abstractive type according to whether our nature, being finite, retains some se-
lected characters from what affects it, of imperative type according to whether
effects are taken for ends, or ideas of effects for causes, actually producing moral
effects, and of hermeneutic type, according to whether humans imagine suprasen-
sible beings as an enlarged image of what effects them. Hence, these types of
signs define sensible indices, logical icons, moral symbols, and metaphysical
idols, respectively. Vectorial signs can be identified with affects and are basically
of an augmentative type, if they carry positive connotations, or of a diminuitive
type, if they carry negative connotations. The common characteristics of all these
signs are associability, variability, and equivocality or analogy. The vectorial
signs may be combined in their effect in order to define explicit gradients of so-
cial fields.44
Deleuze points out that „(if) signs, like words, are conventional, it is precisely
because they act on natural signs and simply classify their variability and equivo-
city: conventional signs are abstractions that fix a relative constant for variable
chains of association. Signs do not have objects as their direct referent. They are
states of bodies (affections) and variations of power (affects), each of which refer
to the other. Signs refer to signs.“45 Thus signs are also effects, and effects refer
to effects as signs to signs. They are actually „consequences separated from their
premises.“ Deleuze uses here an optical metaphor: „Effects or signs are shadows
that play on the surface of bodies. The shadow is always on the border. It is al-
ways a body that casts a shadow on another. ... Signs are effects of light in a
space filled with things colliding into each other at random.“46
In Spinoza, the determining oppositions to signs are common notions or concepts.
They are primarily based on structures, and modes are geometric but fluid struc-
tures that are permanently being transformed. Hence, structure is rhythm, that is,
the linking of figures that compose and de-compose their relations. In this sense,
modes can be visualized as projections of light: „Or rather, the variations of an
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object are projections that envelop a relation of movement and rest as their inva-
riant (involution).“47 So they are also colours or colouring causes: „Colors enter
into relations of complementarity and contrast, which means that each of them, at
the limit, re-constitutes the whole, and that they all merge together in whiteness
(infinite mode) following an order of composition, or stand out from it in the or-
der of de-composition.“48 Hence, the whole „Ethics“ can be read in terms of the
scholia which constitute a book of signs „which never ceases to accompany the
more visible Ethics, the book of the concept ...“49 Signs and affects, or concepts,
shall be transgressed in the end, by arriving at essences or singularities, percepts.
No longer signs of shadow or of light as colour is important then, but light in it-
self and for itself.50 Hence, the adequate form of reflexion required here is simply
a hermeneutic approach to nature. For eventually achieving this, the actual transi-
tion from logic to hermeneutic must be based on the space of free play which is
intrinsic to the mediation of world and substance, modal and real existence, as it
is characterized by the parallelism which can be represented in mathematical
terms. This is an aspect which practically unifies the ontological and epistemolo-
gical domains.
For Spinoza therefore, substance is what is in-itself and what can only be com-
prehended by itself and out of itself. This means that it is something whose con-
cept does not need the concept of anything else in order to be formed. Hence,
substance is its own reason (causa sui), and its essence involves its own exi-
stence. But humans, being a finite mode of this infinite substance, can only per-
ceive their world in terms of attributes of this substance, but not substance itself.
In fact, their world is actually being defined in terms of these attributes of which
there are infinitely many, of which humans however can only perceive the two
which fall into their mode of being: matter (res extensa) and mind (res cogitans).
Note that not only is the world not the same as substance (hence all that there is
for humans is only one special aspect of all that there is in reality), but humans
are also permanently modelling the attributes, in a kind of recursive approximati-
on, rather than perceiving them as they actually are. Hence, the relationship bet-
ween the real perspective of substance and the modal perspective of humans is
difficult to visualize: E.g., although the infinite substance is undivisable (has no
parts), humans actually perceive parts of attributes, but this difference is only gi-
ven in modal, not in real terms. (1p15s)
Hence, for humans, substance is the foundation of being, and as such it is non-
being. It is not nothing, because the world, as visualized in modal terms, has
eventually emerged from substance. In a way, we can say that the world has been
produced by substance out of a field of possibilities. Hence, worldly objects come
into existence by some initial emergence of the world which is thus an exterio-
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rization of substance (in the sense that substance unfolds its organizational struc-
ture - which is not really a process when visualized under the real perspective of
substance, but rather an equivalent self-representation of substance itself). Note
that when we as humans, are talking about this emergence, the very language we
have to use points to a dynamical process of some kind. The reason for this is that
we have to think according to our usual (modal) terms of reflexion which involve
temporality one way or the other. But, in reality, substance within this picture, is
not actually triggering dynamical processes, it is already structured in a way that
it is differentiating itself in terms of infinitely many self-representations, of which
one is what we interpret as our world. Hence, motion in terms of substance is ill-
defined. It is rather that substance is constituted as potentially self-moving in the
sense that it is in a state of permanent self-fluctuation which represents an intrin-
sic sort of motion, an abstract motion (a motion in-itself), and a potential for con-
crete, worldly motion, at the same time. It is in this way that the intrinsically dy-
namical constitution of substance points to a concept of freedom which basically
means „freedom to eventually produce a structured world“. This could be inter-
preted as a kind of absolute freedom which in itself can be taken as a practical
definition of substance.51
The world is therefore a kind of deficient state of substance as it appears only in
terms of restrictions (as being primarily finite). Substance however, as foundation
of being, is itself without foundation. Hence, it is constituted in terms of self-
reference, and it propagates aspects of this self-reference into the world. In this
sense, substance is beyond space and time, it is basically non-local, it may be vi-
sualized as „pre-geometry“. At the same time, the world as the product of sub-
stance is constituted in a transcendental sense, because there is an immanent ten-
dency of the worldly towards returning to its own origin. (Under the real per-
spective of substance this means that substance has itself the tendency to re-
integrate its own unfolding (representation) into itself, which is in fact nothing but
an alternative expression of its own totality. In principle then, the world can be
re-interiorized again, and it is this final stage of development, in which worldly
existence is sublated again in its original (primordial) unity - very much in the
threefold Hegelian sense.
4   Pre-Geometry and TOE
Since the advent of general relativity theory, the strive for a unification of science
(philosophically speaking: for grasping the foundations of physics and hence the
foundation of the world) has entered a new phase of intensity. For Einstein him-
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self, it appeared appropriate to look for a unification in terms of gravitation and
electromagnetism, the two fundamental forces (or interactions) at the time. To be
more precise: Einstein’s idea was to actually include electromagnetic fields in his
gravitational field equations by introducing them (by means of their potentials)
into the metric components of space-time, in first place. As Wolfram Voelcker,
Can Yurtoeven, and myself have shown at another place52, this can be interpreted
in terms of visualizing substance as space-time geometry in the sense of general
relativity, representing gravitation, at the same time. (Indeed, as Lewis Feuer has
pointed out earlier53, it is quite certain that Einstein developed his theory under
the impression of discussing Spinoza’s philosophy when in Prague.) The subse-
quent advent of quantum theory however, to which Einstein himself contributed
some fundamental insight, led to a much more complex situation, because not
only did two more forms of interaction (weak and strong fields) turn up, but the
basic interpretations of relativity on the one side and quantum theory on the other,
differed according to their respective (worldly) domains: on the one hand, relati-
vity being defined in terms of a four-dimensional space-time manifold with a
Lorentz metric (of signature -2), quantum theory on the other, showing up as
being defined in terms of a high-dimensional Hilbert manifold with a positive-
definite (Euklidean) metric. Hence, one ended up with two disjoint domains clai-
ming to explain the same universe. So, although in the meantime various interme-
diate successes have been celebrated (such as the unification of the electroweak
force, or the approach towards a grand unification of the latter with the strong
forces: GUT), the ultimate goal, the unification of all forces (and matter) with
gravitation in a theory of everything (TOE) has not yet been achieved.
During the last three decades, a basically different approach to unification has
been put forward going back to an old idea of John Wheeler’s: If it is not possible
to unify the competitors within the world, it might be possible to unify them out-
side the world, the basic idea being to introduce an abstract mathematical structu-
re from which space and time (and matter) as fundamental categories of the world
could be eventually derived. It is quite straightforward in fact, to notice the con-
notation of substance here: If we define our world in terms of fundamental cate-
gories such as space and time (and matter), then everything outside the world
from which we might be able to derive these fundamental categories is the foun-
dation of the world and as such it is non-being. Hence, the idea is to visualize the
world as a variety which has become out of a primordial (actually pre-worldly)
unity. If so, then the next step, namely to formulate this the other way round: that
the world is in fact this primordial unity as being observed as a becoming variety
by its members who have restricted means of perception, is relatively small.
Contrary to what Einstein thought, space-time-matter would not be substance it-
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self, but only the latter’s worldly attribute. And what is „before“ (and external to)
the world, pre-geometry, would gain the connotation of a substance.
The question is how to reasonably approach such a conception in more detail.
Because, technically, this would point to achieving a unified context for both gra-
vitation and quantum theory anyway. A useful motivation for „quantum gravity“
of that sort has been given by John Baez recently54: There are three fundamental
length scales, defined in terms of three physical constants coming from both regi-
ons in question (h, the Planck constant divided by 2pi, Newton’s gravitational
constant G, and the velocity of light c, respectively), which are important for re-
lativity and quantum theory, at the same time. One is the Planck length lP =
(hG/c3)1/2, of roughly the order of magnitude of 10-35 m.  For length scales smaller
than this, quantum gravity would be the appropriate tool to describe the physics
there. Another one is the Compton wavelength, lC = h/mc, which basically indi-
cates that the measuring of the position of a particle of mass m precisely within
one Compton length, requires energy which is able to create another particle of
the same mass. Hence, this length scale is characteristic for effects in quantum
field theory. Finally, there is the Schwarzschild radius which basically defines the
horizon of a black hole which has been formed by a collpasing star of mass m: lS
= Gm/c2. (All constants up to numerical factors.) If m is now the Planck mass it-
self (mP = (hc/G)1/2), then lC = lS = lP. Hence, we would suppose that at the Planck
scale, both domains of physics should show up in a somewhat unified way.
Thinking of the traditional division of classical relativity, and quantum theory,
respectively, it is quite natural to ask whether the continuum picture of space-time
is only an approximation which inevitably breaks down when approaching the
Planck scale. And if so, whether there are constituents of space and time which
show up according to some scheme of quantization, such as to construct quantum
operators with discrete eigen-values. The microscopic structure of space and time
would be determined then by eigen-values and eigen-vectors of purely geometric
operators, and the macroscopic superposition of these would show up as the well-
known space-time continuum (as a limit for large values). But this would also
mean to abandon any underlying space-time structure we have got accustomed
with (both in relativity and in quantum theory which is also based on a classical
space-time background). As Ashtekar and Krasnov have pointed out, „ ... to pro-
be the nature of quantum geometry, one should not begin by assuming the vali-
dity of the continuum picture; the quantum theory itself has to tell us, if the pictu-
re is adequate ...“55
For their approach, referred to as „loop quantum gravity“, it is the goal therefore,
to find a background-free quantum theory with local degrees of freedom propa-
gating causally. This is also true for related approaches (e.g. topological quantum
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field theory (TQFT) etc.), but it is not for the celebrated theory of superstrings.
The latter has the same objective though, in general terms, namely looking for a
pre-geometric TOE of some kind. It is however, a chiefly perturbative theory
meaning that it starts from a given space-time background (very much in the tra-
dition of quantum theory), performing a perturbation expansion as power series
expansions of the string coupling constants similar to those used in quantum field
theory, and extracting perturbational modes corresponding to physical particles
(or particle fields). To that end, all superstring theories contain a massless scalar
field called the dilaton that belongs to the same supersymmetry multiplet as the
graviton. It determines a suitable string coupling constant on which the perturba-
tion expansions can be based.56 However, the big problem is with the background
(whose existence contradicts the principle of diffeomorphism invariance which is
one of the central results of general relativity). As Carlo Rovelli has put it, kee-
ping a background means to describe the motion of physical entities on a non-
dynamical stage instead of describing the dynamics of the stage itself.57
There are also other problems of which the dimensionality of the appropriate su-
perstring spaces might be the most relevant. Although the Kaluza-Klein tradition
in physics has its merits (and actually impresses by its beauty), and although the
problem of ending up with five ten-dimensional theories rather than with one fun-
damental theory seems to be resolved now by introducing certain dualities among
them, the idea being that there is some large moduli space of consistent vacua of
a single underlying theory (called M theory by now) containing also a theory of
eleven dimensions, it is nevertheless very unsatisfactory - to say the least - that a
mechanism is to be (practically arbitrarily) postulated in order to explain why the
dimensions should curl up to microscopic spaces (which is actually a flagrant
breach of the rule as given in terms of the theorem of sufficient reason) so as to
leave us with the four dimensions as we know them. In fact, as we have seen al-
ready, this could be accounted for in a much more straightforward way, thinking
of our world as an attribute of substance (or: alternatively: as a visualization of
the world’s foundation). Finally: leaving aside the derivation of the black hole
entropy with the exact Bekenstein-Hawking coefficient, which is certainly a suc-
cess in its own right, also the experimental evidence according to the expecta-
tions determined by the standard model, is not very well supported at all, becau-
se, as Rovelli mentions in his review paper, most testable predictions have all
failed to be confirmed so far. Rovelli argues that comparing this lack of success
with the considerable success the standard model had in the past, leads to the as-
sumption that there might be some principal limit to further following this path.58
Things have not been improved since then, as the recent Minnowbrook symposi-
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on has shown.59 This is the reason why within this paper we will concentrate on
the other approach (loop quantum gravity and related) rather than on superstrings
or M theory. But it should be noted that in principle, the latter approach is also on
the line with the concept of substance, and so it is worth being mentioned here.
The approach put forward by Ashtekar and others is mainly based on introducing
a new kind of connection which replaces the Levi-Civita connection of general
relativity. The idea is to simplify procedures and to bring out more clearly the ki-
nematical similarity of this ansatz with Yang-Mills theory. (Recall that according
to the standard theory, Yang-Mills fields show up as gluons in their condensed
state being responsible for the quark confinement. In this model then, matter is
being visualized as consisting of quarks and leptons together with their Yang-
Mills components, namely showing up as 36 quarks (coming in six flavours and
three colours - times two for their anti-particles), six leptons (caring primarily for
weak interactions), and twelve Yang-Mills components (eight for the gluons plus
four for electroweak interactions). These families come typically in three genera-
tions. Usually, this can be alternatively described in terms of group symmetries,
for the GUT of the characteristic form U(1) x SU(2) x SU(3), the idea being that
the subsequent breaking of symmetries would have actually produced the interac-
tions within the universe as we know them. In particular, within string theory,
symmetries may be visualized as side-effects of (string) oscillations in hyper-
space, and it is tried to combine all these components as metric components on
this very hyperspace - which is nothing but the original idea of Kaluza, only
applied to higher dimensions.60)
Coming back to loop quantum gravity: Starting with the 3+1 split of the metric,
the phase space of general relativity can be described in terms of a three-
dimensional manifold M which is compact and without boundary, and a smooth
real SU(2) connection Aia(x), as well as a vector density Eai(x). Here x refers to
co-ordinates on M, the letters a,b, ... = 1,2,3 to spatial, the letters i,j, ... = 1,2,3 to
internal indices. The relation to the conventional symbols is secured by the equa-
tions
g gab = Eai Ebi,
where g = det gab, and
Aia(x) = Γia(x) + γ kia(x),
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Γ being here the spin connection associated to the local triad for whose labelling
the internal indices can be visualized as being used, k referring to the extrinsic
curvature of the constant time 3-surface.61
Note that this space-time-split establishes already a theoretical choice which is
very relevant for the philosophical implications as to the significance of time:
What changes in general relativity in dynamical terms is not the 4-distances
within space-time, but rather the 3-distances within spaces as being nested in
space-time. Hence, the dynamics is essentially one of 3-dimensional Riemannian
spaces. This idea going back to John Wheeler in the sixties is discussed in Julian
Barbour’s new book62, where Barbour points out that the „key geometric pro-
perty of space-times that satisfy Einstein’s equations reflects an underlying prin-
ciple of best matching built into the foundations of the theory.“63 The time sepa-
ration of spatial slices shows up here as what Barbour calls a distinguished sim-
plifier, as an ordering principle for making unfoldings simple.64 If time is being
visualized as a mere ordering principle, then, in philosophical terms, we are left
with space as an attribute. Note however, that the dimensionality of space is only
a finite representation then, which does not reflect the true nature of space, but
only our modal attitude towards it with a view to spatial ordering.
The Ashtekar ansatz is also invariant under local SU(2) gauge transformations,
three-dimensional diffeomorphisms of the manifold on which the fields are de-
fined, as well as under (coordinate) time translations generated by the Hamilto-
nian constraint. The full dynamical content of general relativity is also captured
by the three constraints that generate these gauge invariances.65 So what we can
do now is to compare the configuration variable of general relativity as known
from gauge theories with the SU(2) connection A on a spatial 3-manifold, and the
canonically conjugate momentum E with the Yang-Mills „electric“ field. Physi-
cally, the latter is essentially the triad and carries all information about space.
This is where in quantum theory, the gauge invariant Wilson loop functionals are
coming in: They are the path-ordered exponentials of the connections around clo-
sed loops. Hence, the name for the theory (loop quantum gravity). We will come
to that in a moment.
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Note however another relationship first: Usually, the kinematics of quantum theo-
ry is defined by an algebra of operators on a Hilbert space. The outcome of the
physical theory will depend on the connection which can be uncovered between
operators and classical variables, and on the interpretation of the Hilbert space as
a space of quantum states. The dynamics is determined by a Hamiltonian (in ge-
neral relativity called quantum constraint) constructed from the operators. The
idea is now to express quantum states in terms of the amplitude of the connection,
given by some functional of the type Ψ(A) in the sense of Schrödinger. Functio-
nals of this kind form a space which can be made into a Hilbert space provided a
suitable inner product is being defined. Having done this, we can express the am-
plitude as Ψ(A) = <AΨ> in Dirac notation. Is now H our Hilbert space, then we
define H0 as its subspace formed by states invariant under SU(2) gauge transfor-
mations. Then it can be shown that an orthonormal basis in H0 is actually a spin
network basis.
What is a spin network? Basically, spin networks are graphs with three-valued
nodes and spin values on the edges, their states being denoted by Γ>. To take
the norm refer to the mirror image of a graph and tie up the ends, forming a clo-
sed spin network Γ#Γ* of value V such that
<ΓΓ> = V(Γ#Γ*)
with
V(...) = Π (1/j!) Σ ε(-2)N,
here j being the edge label, N the number of closed loops, and ε referring to the
intertwining operation taking care of permutations of signs. The product is to be
taken over all edges, the sum over all routings. Hence, the networks can be vi-
sualized in diagrammatic form such as to represent the underlying „spin dyna-
mics“. For instance, a diagram with vertices a, b, c, and i, j, k within the region of
intertwiners such that i + j = a, i + k = b, j + k = c, can be interpreted as two par-
ticles with spin a and b which produce (create) a particle with spin c. Spin inter-
actions of this kind can lead to the creation of new structures: Take a large part of
the network (effectively representing a part of the universe) and detach from this
small m-units, and n-units, respectively, as „free ends“. The outcome of their ty-
ing up to form a new structure can be estimated in terms of a probability for the
latter having spin number P, say. This turns out as being basically the quotient of
the norm of the closed network and the norm of the network with free ends (times
some intertwining operations). The spin geometry theorem tells us then that when
repeating this procedure and getting the same outcome, then the new quotient is
proportional to (1/2) cos θ, where the angle is one which is taken between the
axes of the large units. Hence, it is possible to show that angles obtained in this
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way satisfy the well-known laws of Euklidean geometry. Or, in other words: This
purely combinatorial procedure can be used to actually approximate space from a
pre-spatial structure which is more basic. This idea has been due to Penrose who
originally tried to base his concept of twistors on spin networks. In looking for
primary concepts of an abstract structure from which space (and eventually
space-time) could be approximated, starting from purely combinatorial elements,
he began with looking more closely to the implications of angular momentum as
to the re-construction of space.66 The consequences of this approach have re-
mained relevant until today, although twistors are not in fashion nowadays.67
A generalization of spin networks and a connection with knot theory has been
achieved more recently by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin referring to their con-
cept of quantum gravity: They start with loops from the outset and show that sin-
ce spin network states <S span the loop state space, it follows that any ket state
ψ> is uniquely determined by the values of the S-functionals on it, namely of the
form
ψ(S) := <Sψ>.
To be more precise, Rovelli and Smolin take embedded spin networks rather than
the usual spin networks, i.e. they take the latter plus an immersion of its graph
into a 3-manifold. Considering then, the equivalence classes of embedded orien-
ted spin networks under diffeomorphisms, it can be shown that they are to be
identified by the knotting properties of the embedded graph forming the network
and by its colouring (which is the labelling of its links with positive integers refer-
ring to spin numbers).68
When generalizing this concept even further, a network design may be introduced
as a conceptual approach towards pre-geometry based on the elementary concept
of distinctions, as Louis Kauffman has shown.69 In particular, space-time can be
visualized as being produced directly from the operator algebra of a distinction. If
thinking of distinctions in terms of 1-0 (or yes-no) decisions, we have a direct link
here to information theory, which has been discussed recently again with a view
to holography.70 Ashtekar and Krasnov have noted this already when deriving the
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celebrated Bekenstein-Hawking formula in applying loops to black holes. Refer-
ring to punctured horizons they can show that each set of punctures gives actually
rise to a Hilbert space of (Chern-Simons) quantum states of the connection on the
horizon. Be P = {jp1 ... jpn} the set of punctures, and Hp the respective Hilbert
space. Then dim Hp ∼ Πjp∈P(2jp + 1), and the entropy of the black hole is simply
given by Sbh = ln ∑P dim HP. The edges of spin networks can be visualized then as
flux lines carrying area. With each given configuration of flux lines, there is a fi-
nite-dimensional Hilbert space describing the quantum states associated with cur-
vature excitations initiated by the punctures of the horizon. Because the states
that dominate the counting (for S) correspond to punctures all of which have la-
bels j = ½, each microstate can be thought of as providing a yes-no decision or an
71
 Hence, the reference to Wheeler’s „It from
Bit“. (Paola Zizzi has tried to generalize this within the conception of inflationary
cosmology, and terms this „It from Qubit“.72)
Generalized spin networks can be used now for lattice gauge theory and for non-
perturbative quantum gravity. In the former case, they turn out as products of
Wilson loops. In the latter case, it can be found that the space of diffeomorphism
invariant states is spanned by a basis which is in one-to-one correspondence with
embeddings of spin networks.
Note that according to the standard terminology, a loop in some space Σ, say, is a
continuous map γ from the unit interval into Σ such that γ(0) = γ(1). The set of all
such maps will be denoted by ΩΣ, the loop space of Σ. Given a loop element γ,
and a space x 73 of connections, we can define a complex function on xx ΩΣ, the
socalled Wilson loop such that
TA(γ) := (1/N) TrR P exp ∫γ A.
Here, the path-ordered exponential of the connection A∈x, along the loop γ, is
also known as the holonomy of A along γ. The holonomy measures the change
undergone by an internal vector when parallel transported along γ. The trace is
taken in the representation R of G (which is the Lie group of Yang-Mills theory),
N being the dimensionality of this representation. The quantity measures therefore
the curvature (or field strength) in a gauge-invariant way.74
In Topological Quantum Field Theory and in Conformal Field Theory, the path
integral definitions are mainly based on (quantum) Chern-Simons theory. (Recall
that if A is a connection 1-form for a gauge group, then the quantum Chern-
Simons theory has the path integral
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Z = ∫ dµ(A) exp (ih/4pi SCS(A)),
where S = ∫ Tr (A ∧ dA + 2/3 A ∧ A ∧ A) is the Chern-Simons action on a com-
pact 3-manifold Σ.) Over a given loop γ, the expectation value < T(γ)> turns out
to be equal to a knot invariant (the „Kauffman bracket“) such that when applied
to spin networks, the latter shows up as a deformation of Penrose’s value V(Γ).
This is mainly due to the fact that
< T(γ)> = Kk(γ) = (1/Z) ∫ dµ(A) exp (...) T(γ, A).
So, for any spin network Γ (replace γ by Γ), the old relation holds up to regula-
rization. Hence, spin networks are deformed into quantum spin networks (which
are essentially given by a family of deformations of the original networks of Pen-
rose labelled by a deformation parameter q = exp (4pi/(k+2)) for the Chern-
Simons case). The latter may be understood as built up from the representation
theory of quantum groups which are deformations of Lie algebras (namely Hopf
algebras).75
Similar results can also be shown in terms of a categorial approach introduced by
Segal and Atiyah.76 Note also that the CS invariant is important when having a
non-zero cosmological constant Λ, because there is an exact physical state of
quantum gravity given by ΨCS (A) = exp (k/4pi SCS (A)), where k is actually rela-
ted to Newton’s constant by G2Λ = 6pi/k. This state can be shown to reproduce
Kk(Γ) above.77
There is also a simplicial aspect to this: Loop quantum gravity provides for a
quantization of geometric entities such as area and volume. The main sequence of
the spectrum of area e.g., shows up as A = 8piγhG ∑i(ji(ji + 1))1/2, where the j’s
are half-integers labelling the eigenvalues. (Compare this with the remarks on
black holes above.) This quantization shows that the states of the spin network
basis are eigenvalues of some area and volume operators. We can say that a spin
network carries quanta of area along its links, and quanta of volume at its nodes.
A quantum space-time can be decomposed therefore, in a basis of states visuali-
zed as made up by quanta of volume which in turn are separated by quanta of
area (at the intersections and on the links, respectively). Hence, we can visualize
a spin network as sitting on the dual of a cellular de-composition of physical
space.78
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As far as the dynamics of spin networks is concerned, there is still another, more
recent approach, which appears to be promising as to the further development of
topological aspects of quantum gravity (referred to as TQFT). In setting out to
develop this new ansatz79, John Baez notes that there are basically only two new
ideas involved in loop quantum gravity. One is the insistence on a background-
free approach. The other is to base the theory on the aspect of parallel transport
rather than on the metric. Spin networks are at the basis of this approach. But al-
though originally, Penrose thought of them in terms of describing the geometry of
space-time, they really turn out to describe the geometry space much better. The
idea of Baez is therefore, to supplement loop quantum gravity with an appropriate
path-integral formalism. While in traditional quantum field theory, path integrals
are calculated using Feynman diagrams, he would like to introduce two-
dimensional analogues of the latter, called spin foams.80 Basically, a spin foam is
a two-dimensional complex built from vertices, edges, and polygonal faces, with
the faces labelled by group representations, and the edges labelled by intertwining
operators. If we take a generic slice of a spin foam, we get a spin network. The
first explication of spin foams Baez performs with a view to BF theory (as a first
simple step).
For this, choose as a gauge group any Lie group G whose Lie algebra is equipped
with an invariant non-degenerate bilinear form. Take as space-time any n-
dimensional oriented smooth manifold M, and choose a principal G-bundle P over
M. The basic fields are the connection A on P, an ad(P)-valued (n-2)-form E on
M, where ad(P) refers to a vector bundle associated with P via the adjoint action
of G onto its Lie algebra, and the curvature of A, which is an ad(P)-valued 2-form
F on M. The Lagrangian for BF theory is simply L = tr (E ∧ F). Setting the varia-
tion of the action zero gives the field equations: δ∫M L = 0 ⇒ F = 0, dA E = 0. He-
re, d is the exterior covariant derivative. The first equation tells us that the con-
nection A is flat. BF theory shows up as a topological field theory, and locally all
solutions look the same, because it does not have any local degrees of freedom.
The second equation determines the gauge symmetries. The configuration space
of BF theory is the space A of connections on P.81 The corresponding classical
phase space is the cotangent bundle T*A . Be A0 the moduli space of flat connec-
tions on P, the physical phase space, and be G  the group of gauge transforma-
tions of the bundle P. Then the canonical quantization program can be visualized
by the following diagram:
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T*(A ) → quantize → L2(A )
↓                             ↓
 constrain                   constrain
↓                            ↓
T*(A /G) → quantize → L2(A /G)
      ↓                             ↓
  constrain                    constrain
      ↓                             ↓
T*(A0/G) → quantize → L2(A0/G)
The problem is that typically, A  and A /G, are infinite-dimensional, making it dif-
ficult to define the related L2-spaces.82 But, as Baez points out, the great achie-
vement of loop quantum gravity is that it gives background-free definitions of the-
se Hilbert spaces by leaving the traditional Fock space formalism and taking ho-
lonomies along paths instead as basic variables. Hence, the basic excitations are
not particles anymore (0-dimensional entities), but 1-dimensional spin networks.
It turns out, in fact, that L2(A /G) is actually being spanned by spin network states.
Call such a state Ψ∈ Fun (A /G) so that any spin network in S ( = space) defines
such a function. Because Fun is an algebra (namely consisting of all functions on
A of the form Ψ(A) = f(T exp ∫γ1 A ... T exp ∫γn A), where f is a continuous com-
plex-valued function of finitely many holonomies which are represented here by
the integral expressions), multiplication by Ψ defines an operator on Fun. We call
this operator spin network observable. (It actually extends to a bounded operator
on L2, because Ψ is bounded.) In fact, any product of Wilson loop observables
can be written as a finite linear combination of spin network observables. Hence,
the latter can be used to measure correlations among holonomies of A around a
collection of loops. Moreover, it can be shown that a spin network edge labelled
by the spin j contributes a length (j(j + 1))1/2 (s.a.) to any curve it crosses transver-
sely. Hence, length has a discrete spectrum of possible values in quantum gravity.
Note that there is a very promising aside concerning triangulations: Given (n-1)-
dimensional space S and any triangulation of it, choose a graph called „dual 1-
skeleton“, having one vertex at the centre of each (n-1)-simplex and one edge in-
tersecting each (n-2)-simplex. We can express now any state in Fun(A0/G) as a
linear combination of states coming from spin networks whose underlying graph
is this dual 1-skeleton. Using the holonomy picture we already know, we can de-
fine Hilbert spaces L2(Aγ) and L2(Aγ/Gγ) as before such that any spin network with
γ as its underlying graph defines a function Ψ∈L2(Aγ/Gγ). Spin network states are
functions of the type Ψ(A). They span the respective L2-space, and we can the-
refore choose an orthonormal basis of them. Now, if γ is a graph in S, trivializing
the principal G-bundle with which S is equipped at the vertices of γ, gives a map
A → Aγ and a homomorphism G → Gγ such that L2 (Aγ) ⊂→ L2 (A) and the same
                                                       
82
 Baez, op.cit. (n.71), 3-7.
27
for A/G, ⊂→ referring here to the inclusion mapping. When γ is the dual 1-
skeleton of a triangulation of S, for 3-dimensional Riemannian quantum gravity, it
is always trivalent and particularly easy to visualize (having actually a hexagonal
network pattern superimposing the triangulation). Spin numbers specify the
lengths of the edges, with spin j corresponding to length (j(j + 1))1/2. The same
can be performed for 4-dimensional BF theory using 4-valent graphs now and
tetrahedra.83
The definition of a spin foam now is very much alike the one for a spin network,
only one dimension higher. A spin foam is essentially taking one spin network
into another, of the form F: Ψ→Ψ’. Just as spin networks are designed to merge
the concepts of quantum state and geometry of space, spin foams shall serve the
merging of concepts of quantum history and geometry of space-time.84 Very
much like Feynman diagrams do, also spin foams can be used to evaluate infor-
mation about the history of a transition of which the amplitude is being deter-
mined. Hence, if Ψ and Ψ’ are spin networks with underlying graphs γ and γ’,
then any spin foam F: Ψ→Ψ’ determines an operator from L2(Aγ /Gγ) to L2(Aγ’ /Gγ’)
denoted by O such that
<Φ’, O Φ> = <Φ’, Ψ’><Ψ, Φ>
for any states Φ, Φ’. The evolution operator Z(M) is a linear combination of the-
se operators weighted by the amplitudes Z(O). Obviously, we can define a cate-
gory with spin networks as objects and spin foams as morphisms.
So what we essentially do is the following: Given the (n-1)-dimensional S and a
triangulation of S, choose a graph called the dual 1-skeleton. Express any state in
Fun as a linear combination of states coming from spin networks whose underly-
ing graph is this dual 1-skeleton. Define now space-time as a compact oriented
cobordism M: S → S’, where S, S’ are compact oriented manifolds of dimension
n-1. (Recall that two closed (n-1)-manifolds X and Y are said to be cobordant, if
there is an n-manifold Z with boundary such that ∂Z is the disjoint union of X and
Y.85) Choose a triangulation of M such that the triangulations of S, S’ with dual
1-skeletons γ, γ’ can be determined. The basis for gauge-invariant Hilbert spaces
is given by the respective spin networks. Then the evolution operator Z(M):
L2(Aγ/Gγ) → L2(Aγ’/Gγ’) determines transition amplitudes <Ψ’, Z(M) Ψ> with Ψ,
Ψ’ being spin network states. Write the amplitude as a sum over spin foams from
Ψ to Ψ’: < , > = ∑F:Ψ→Ψ’ Z(F) plus composition rules such that Z(F’) o Z(F) =
Z(F’ o F). This is a discrete version of a path integral. Hence, re-arrangement of
spin numbers on the „combinatorial level“ is equivalent to an evolution of states
in terms of Hilbert spaces in the „quantum picture“ and effectively changes the
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topology of space on the „cobordism level“. This can be understood as a kind of
manifold morphogenesis in time: Visualize the n-dimensional manifold M (with
∂M = S ∪ S’ - disjointly) as M: S → S’, that is as a process (or as time) passing
from S to S’. This the mentioned cobordism. Note that composition of cobor-
disms holds and is associative, but not commutative. The identity cobordism can
be interpreted as describing a passage of time when topology stays constant. If
there is no change of topology (due to the action of the identity cobordism), then
there is no change of state, because we do not have any local degrees of freedom
here. Visualized this way, TQFT might suggest that general relativity and quan-
tum theory are not so different after all. In fact, the concepts of space and state
turn out to be two aspects of a unified whole, likewise space-time and process.
Note that „time“ shows up here not as a function, but as a manifold (although ar-
rows are used). This is particularly interesting, because with a view to what Bar-
bour tells us about the „absence“ of time, this means that the concept of time is
intrinsically included here as a pragmatic ordering principle for localizing topolo-
gy changes. This is similar to what Prigogine calls the „age of a system“, which is
roughly a frequency of formations of new structures in a system making the latter
more complex. Time as a convention then, would be an approximate „average“
over such ages. (I have commented on this in more detail at another place.86)
Hence, time shows up as being associated to a kind of measuring device for local
complexity gradients. So what we have in the end, is a rough (and simplified)
outline of the foundations of emergence, in the sense that we can localize the fine
structure of emergence (the re-arrangements of spin numbers in purely combina-
torial terms being visualized as a motion-in-itself) and its results on the „macros-
copic“ scale (as a change of topology being visualized by physical observers as a
motion-for-itself). This is actually what we would expect of a proper theory of
emergence. But note also that space and time, in the classical sense, are obviously
absent on a fundamental level of the theory, but can be recovered as concepts
when tracing the way „upward“ to macroscopic structures. In other words: even
as a gross average feature for „shortsighted“ human scientists (as Penrose indi-
cates it at the end of his first twistor paper), space and time would nevertheless
turn up as (philosophical) categories of concepts, simply, because the meaning of
these categories is well-adapted to what humans actually perceive of their world
(and communicate to other humans). This is in fact, a point, where Barbour’s ar-
gument seems to break down (if discussed within this philosophical perspective):
What he essentially shows in his book is that quantum theory, in so far as it is
foundational, describes partly what was called non-being (or substance) in former
times. Hence, there is neither space nor time in real terms ( = realiter, i.e. with
respect to what there is in an absolute sense of the world’s foundation), but there
is space and time in modal terms ( = modaliter, i.e. with respect to what humans
perceive of their world). The former refers to substance, or, alternatively, to what
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speculative philosophy is all about. The latter refers to the physical world, or, to
what sceptical philosophy is all about. The one relies on theoretical speculation
according to what we know - speculating about the foundation of the world,
which is outside (logically „before“) the world, and of which we are not a part
therefore, and hence, about which we cannot actually know anything. The other
refers to the empirical world, about which, with the help of experiments, we can
obtain knowledge, in fact. Obviously, in terms of physics, the first (speculative)
aspect is corresponding to physical theory, in so far as it is foundational. The se-
cond (sceptical) aspect corresponds to physical theory, in so far as it is empiri-
cal.87
These results can also be formulated in the language of category theory: As
TQFT maps each manifold S representing space to a Hilbert space Z(S) and each
cobordism M: S → S’ representing space-time to an operator Z(M): Z(S) →
Z(S’) such that composition and identities are preserved, this means that TQFT is
a functor Z: nCob → Hilb. Note that the non-commutativity of operators in
quantum theory corresponds to non-commutativity of composing cobordisms, and
adjoint operation in quantum theory turning an operator A: H → H’ into A*: H’
→ H corresponds to the operation of reversing the roles of past and future in a
cobordism M: S → S’ obtaining M*: S’ → S.88
5   Topoi - Wordly & Pre-Wordly
We have already noted the significance of categories for the approaches we are
interested in. Louis Crane has announced that category theory would probably be
a unifying principle in physics.89 But this is not simply a point of formal concep-
tualization. It is also an important aspect of the process of thinking itself. For the
first time, Vladimir Trifonov has made this aspect explicit, as a consequence of
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applying topos-theoretic concepts to physics.90 He introduces topoi (toposes)91 as
abstract worlds which represent universes of mathematical discourse whose inha-
bitants can utilize non-Boolean logics for their argumentation (i.e. their proposi-
tional structures). In contrary to the sensory space which mainly describes the
observations of observers ( = researchers), the space of motions is the set of acti-
ons. Be F a partially ordered field. Then, an F-xenomorph is a category A(F) of
linear algebras over F. The objects of A(F) are called paradigms of an F-
xenomorph, the arrows are called actions. Essentially, a paradigm then, is the set
of states of knowledge. A paradigm is called rational, if the space of motions
M(A) is a monoid. In particular, it can be shown that the set of all possible acti-
ons of a researcher is a topos whose arrows are those mappings which preserve
realizations of the monoid (of the space of motions). It can also be shown that, if
A is a rational paradigm, and the topos of all possible actions is Boolean (non-
Boolean), then the paradigm A is classical (non-classical). For a xenomorph F =
R of a generic type of the observer’s psychology, Trifonov can finally show that
an R-xenomorph implies a classical Einstein paradigm, i.e. dimension 4 and si-
gnature 2 of the space-time metric. Also: If A is a non-trivial Grassmann algebra,
then the paradigm is the Grassmannian of an R-xenomorph. Because A has a zero
divisor, M(A) cannot be a group. Hence, the logic of a Grassmannian paradigm is
always non-Boolean, and the mathematics is non-classical. As I have discussed at
another place92, it is very likely that the category of negators (essentially opera-
tors acting upon „world states“ in order to produce complexity, which can also be
visualized as chaotic self-compositions of some suitable, unfolding „ground state“
of the world) forms a topos. (They may even turn out to be basically identical
with the functor Z: nCob → Hilb, discussed in the preceding section in terms of
TQFT.) The interesting point in the conception of Trifonov’s is that (the logically
formal part of) thinking itself is directly related to the physical process of unfol-
ding the worldly structure as it can be described in terms of cosmological evoluti-
on. The basic idea in this is to define a self-referent cycle in the sense that the
physical process is producing observers who choose their explicit logic for eva-
luating what they actually observe. We recognize the idea again, of nature explo-
ring itself by means of human research (or telling its own story to itself, as a kind
of self-narration which is modelling its own self-unfolding).
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Note however that this time, we have a sound mathematical base for giving a
consistent foundation for such a view. In fact, the speculative part of the theory
(as far as the aspect of substance and its relationship to its own attributes is con-
cerned) is at least partially formalized, with respect to two important points: On
the one hand, it is formalized in being integrated into the description of the physi-
cal process itself. On the other hand, it is formalized according to the process of
thinking such as to give an explicit choice of logical types which can be utilized
for interpreting observations made. The crucial aspect here is in particular that the
appropriate logical type can be used to reproduce the phenomenological structure
of the worldly observations actually being made (as we know them). Take irre-
versibility for instance: Types of logic which have a modified law of negation, of
the kind ¬ (¬ x) ≠ x, if x is a given proposition, determine the phenomenology as
it is actually being observed according to the fact that processes are irreversible in
the sense that their logical representation cannot reproduce initial propositions,
independent of the number of negation operations acting repeatedly on such pro-
positions. In other words: Recursive operations of this type have no fixed points.
In a sense, we can say that temporality is coming in explicitly where earlier the
logic remained static all the time (and created considerable difficulties when
comparing theory with praxis, as e.g. Lacan has shown in some detail93). Hence,
the advantage of topoi: They operate in terms of an intrinsic concept of time
which can be visualized as a kind of generic concept, unifying the object level of
a theory (that about which the theory is actually speaking) with the subject level
(which determines the logic of the observer who actually speaks - in terms of the
theory). This is another indication as to the phenomenological necessity of time
on a macroscopic level of worldly perception and reflexion. (But, as said before,
this does not alter the fact that on a fundamental level, time as a concept, may be
absent altogether.)94
To this end, we note that the process of the concrete, physical unfolding of the
world (as it can be assessed in empirical terms) is essentially identical with the
process of reflecting about it, in a cyclic manner which secures that the egg co-
mes before the hen. Following Sandkühler here95, we call this aspect „onto-
epistemic“, in the sense that both the ontological and epistemological components
of the human mode of grasping the world operate very much on the same footing
(also very close to Spinoza’s argument given in his 2p7, as we have seen earlier).
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But in the meantime, we can do a little more, thanks to recent research underta-
ken in terms of topos theory. We will shortly elaborate on this in the following.
We begin with recent work of Isham and Butterfield on topos theory and quantum
physics.96
This ansatz is particularly interesting, because it starts from a propositional view-
point, in first place: Basically, the Kochen-Specker theorem states the impossibi-
lity of assigning values to all physical quantities, when (at the same time) preser-
ving the functional relations among them. Or, in more technical terms: If dim H is
greater than two, there are no global valuations. Reconceive of a valuation now,
as giving truth values to propositions about the values of a physical quantity rat-
her than assigning a value to the quantity itself. Here, a certain amount of con-
textuality is involved, in which a value ascribed to a quantity cannot be part of a
global assignment of values, but must instead depend on some context. The idea
is then, to eventually re-introduce globality, but for the price of ending up with
partial truth values, which means that the truth value of a proposition belongs to a
logical structure that is larger than {0,1}, and these target-logics are context-
dependent. In particular, the space of contexts is the category of all Boolean
subalgebras of the projection lattice (rather than the category of self-adjoint ope-
rators).
There are two basic aspects to this ansatz: The first one is that a theorem can be
proven97 which states that to each generalized valuation v, there is a natural
transformation V: Σ → Ω for which, at each stage of truth, the component with
respect to A, is defined by VA(a) := v(A = a). Here, A refers to the spectral
representation of bounded self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space H. They are
the objects of a category O for which the morphisms are maps B → A, if the-
re is a Borel function f: σ(A) → R such that B = f(A), when σ is the spec-
trum, and A = ∫σ λ dE, with E being the spectral projection operators. Then, a
generalized valuation on propositions in a quantum theory is a map v that asso-
ciates with each group of the form A∈∆, ∆ being a Borel subset of σ(A), a sie-
ve v(A∈∆) on A in O. This is actually the crucial point: to associate a sieve,
which is the reason for Ω in the theorem to be a subobject classifier.
Recall that in fact, parallel to set theory, where subsets of some set are in 1-1 cor-
respondence with characteristic functions whose target space can be visualized as
giving the simplest „false-true“-Boolean algebra, in topos theory, subobjects of
an object are similarly in 1-1 correspondence with „characteristic“ morphisms
having a special object, called the subobject classifier, as their target space which
is analogous to {0,1}. Take a poset C then: A function that assigns to each p∈C a
set Xp, and to each pair p ≤ q a map Xqp: Xq → Xp such that Xpp = id (Xp), and
whenever p ≤ q ≤ r, then Xrp = Xqp o Xrq, is called a pre-sheaf X on C. A subob-
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ject K of a pre-sheaf X is then essentially another pre-sheaf with a similar map,
Kqp say, which is the restriction of Xqp. The collection of all pre-sheaves on a po-
set C forms a category, denoted SetC. This can be shown to be a topos then, be-
cause pre-sheaves can be defined via sieves, which are collections of morphisms
acting on objects of C such that compositions are preserved. The crucial property
of sieves is that there are subobject classifiers which have the structure of a Hey-
ting algebra. (To see this note with the above that, given a pre-sheaf Ω: C → Set,
and an object A of C, then Ω(A) is the set of all sieves on A, and if f: B → A,
then Ω(f): Ω(A) → Ω(B) is defined as the pull-back to B of the sieve S on A by
the morphism f:
Ω(f)(S):= {h: C → B  f o h ∈ S},
for all S∈Ω(A).) The existence of a subobject classifier can be taken as a defining
property of a topos. The former does turn out to be an object of possible truth
values such that there is a characteristic morphism in the above mentioned sense,
which, at each „stage of truth“ A in C, can be written like
χA (x) := {f: B → A  X(f)(x) ∈ K(B)},
for all x∈X(A). Hence, each stage of truth serves as a possible context for an as-
signment to each proposition x of a generalized truth value, which is a sieve be-
longing to the Heyting algebra Ω. (This being the result of finding out that a va-
luation on propositions must be some sort of structure-preserving function from
the set of propositions to the set of truth values of logical algebra. Within this
language, the Kochen-Specker theorem can be rephrased, saying that there is no
global section of pre-sheaves arising in quantum theory. Defining generalized
valuations then, whose values are sieves of operators, can be used to show that
each quantum state actually generates such a valuation.)
The basic ideas for this go back to Lawvere who in the late seventies developed a
very elegant concept of motion as derived from logical properties of topoi.98 As a
short aside note that in particular, the states X of a body B should be sufficient to
determine their own evolution provided the general law of motion L  (in the La-
grangian sense) is known. In fact, X may involve histories of motion, but there is
always a morphism X → Q (the configuration space of B), expressing the fact
that each state involves a specific underlying configuration. Classically, the state
space will be X = QD (the tangent bundle) meaning that infinitesimal histories are
all that is necessary. The configuration space Q ⊂→ EB (subspace of admissable
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placements) implies that X ⊂→ Q x VB (space of velocity fields on B). The dy-
namically possible motions of B can be singled out from the kinetically possible
(QT) by knowing the Lagrangian L: X → W, where the latter refers to the work
needed to add to the potential energy of q in order to obtain the kinetic energy of
the velocity field v. Note that q a morphism T x B → E, describing the motion of
B in E, where E is usually equipped with a Euklidean metric d: E x E → R. Then,
the action is given by
I = ∫ L (q, ∂q/∂t) dt,
which is a morphism Q → A = W ⊗ T, Q ⊂→ QT. The object of the L-possible
motions is then the subobject of Q such that grad (I) vanishes. This gives the
usual Lagrangian equations of motions.99 To the aspect of having a concept of
„intrinsic motion“ we will come back later again.
The second aspect in Isham and Butterfield is more in the propositional field100.
Although discussed in somewhat intuitive terms, the explication that truth values
are essentially sieves, turns out to be of a significant relevance: Given a category
C, and to each object A∈C, a set P(A). For each A and d∈P(A), [A,d] shall be
thought of as a proposition. If there is a morphism f: B → A, then there is also a
function f*: {[A,d]  d∈P(A)} → {[B,e]  e∈P(B)} acting on the d’s. Hence, gi-
ven f, then [B, f*(d)] is the B-proposition that corresponds to the respective A-
proposition by f. Note that if now the composition f: B → A, g: C → B; f o g: C
→ A with g*(f*(d)) = (F o g)*(d) is not satisfied, then the *-operation is actually
path-dependent: If a morphism k: C → A can be factored as C →gB →fA, then
the pull-back k*(d) of d∈P(A) may not be equal to g*(f*(d)) obatined by facto-
ring through B. While the authors refer to this situation in physical terms as being
clearly „pathological“, it may be exactly this case which is common for most
hermeneutic systems of propositional structures. We will come back to that in the
final section.
The general idea is then to assign truth values to each of the propositions. Ob-
viously, [B, f*(d)] is logically weaker than [A,d], because it is its consequence
(≤). If now v(A,d) is the truth value assigned to [A,d], then if the latter is totally
true, so are all of its consequences. If it is partially true, it is more true the more
its consequences are totally true. The truth value v(A,d) is to be determined by
which of the consequences [B, f*(d)] of [A,d] is totally true. So there is actually
the possibility to define „truth distances“, and the semantic value (contents) of a
proposition is actually being determined by the set of those of its consequences
that are true. Hence, v(A,d) is the set of morphisms f: B → A such that the asso-
ciated [B, f*(d)] is totally true. (Recall that „totally“ and „partially“ refer to the
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cases according to whether the characteristic object is {0,1} only, or larger than
that, respectively.) The proposal is then, that for any [A,d], total truth is just
v(A,d) being the set of all morphisms of type f (which is actually the principal
sieve on A) - underlying the idea that v(A,d) is a sieve, indeed.
Obviously, these aspects of propositional semantics are of some importance
within the field of computer science. Although computer logic might turn out to
be not equal to human logic, it is nevertheless very interesting to have a look for
possible applications of the above said to this domain.
So, some time ago, starting from a somewhat different perspective, Abramsky
and Vickers have begun to place notions of observing and testing processes
within an algebraic framework in which observations effectively constitute a
quantale, and the propositions of geometric logic are related to the logic of fini-
tely observable properties.101 To this purpose they define topological systems to
be essentially topological spaces and locales, at the same time, the latter being
homomorphisms from the frames of open sets (the complete Heyting algebras) to
the set 2. The idea is then that finitely observable properties closed under propo-
sitional connectives of geometric logic only, give a computational interpretation
of topology and domain theory in some logical form.
A quantale is basically a sup-lattice (a complete join semilattice) equipped with a
monoid structure satisfying distributive laws. Hence, quantales are to linear logic
as frames are to intuitionistic logic.102 The programme is then, to use the algebraic
framework of modules over quantales to analyze a process equivalence. One of
the interesting results is the following: Take typed semantics with two types
which are objects of a quantaloid. This is a small category such that each homo-
morphism set is a sup-lattice, and the morphism composition distributes over all
joins. (In fact, Hom(quantaloid) is a functor that preserves all joins.) The types
are called live (*) and dead (⊥). Actions are observed of a live process, refusals
and acceptances are postmortem observations. Introduce ♠ to mark the transition
from life to death. Then we get a directed graph which generates the ready quan-
taloid:
                                                        αX
α         *    →♠→   ⊥
                                                        α√
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What does that actually mean? Basically, the idea deals with the testing of equi-
valences of processes, defining the respective types of equivalence by quantales
with a testing preorder, using Act as the set of atomic actions. Then, a transition
system labelled over Act is a set Proc equipped with a transition relation → ⊆
Proc x Act x Proc. Quantales can be shown to actually generalize both topologi-
cal spaces and transition systems. Technical refinements of this103 do yield a
whole family of testing equivalences on processes, as instances of an algebrai-
cally formulated axiomatic framework. The diagram deals actually with three of
them: Ready (R), Failure (F), and Acceptance (A), which are closely related to
their respective traces RT, FT, and AT, but with the property that after refusal or
acceptance, no more pure actions are possible. They are represented by a suitable
quantaloid, and according to a suggestion of Abramsky104, that different process
equivalences represent equivalence in behaviour under different notions of how
the processes can be tested or observed, certain fundamental observations are
formalized as generators of quantales. They are called subbasic (in analogy with
topology), and are defined with respect to a fixed set Act of process actions.
Hence, α is the observation that action α has been effectively performed, along
with any associated change of state. Then αX is the refusal of α, meaning the ob-
servation that the process has signalled its inability to perform α. There is no
change of state (although the state of knowledge improves). Finally, α√ is the ac-
ceptance of α, i.e. the observation that the process has signalled its ability to
perform α, although it has not yet done so. The latter two are propositional in
nature.
Take e.g. the failures semantics F: Let Act be a set. Then we may present the
quantaloid of the form
Q = {α: * → * (α∈Act), ♠: * → ⊥, αX: ⊥ → ⊥ 
           αX • αX ≤ 1⊥, αX • βX = βX • αX}
and the testing order by
1* ≤ ♠,
♠ • XX  ≤ α ∨ ♠ • (X ∪ {α})X.
The first inequality tells us that if a process is live, then it can die. For the second
one, suppose that p is a live process, and that after death, a postmortem examina-
tion reveals that it would refuse the actions in X: p • ♠ • XX ≠ 0. Consider then,
whether p could have done α. If so, then p • α ≠ 0; if not, then a more careful
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postmortem examination would reveal that p would refuse the actions in X ∪
{α}: p • ♠ • (X ∪ {α})X ≠ 0. Inherent in this is the notion of the meaning of a
process: The meaning of a process is given by the set of its capabilities: Be a ∈
Q a quantale such that {p} • a ≠ ∅. Then construct the semantic domain for
processes out of Q. The question is now when two elements of Q might be equi-
valent as process capabilities: Given a, b in Q, when do we have that for every
process p, {p} • a ≠ ∅ iff {p} • b ≠ ∅? This is basically what this kind of „alge-
braic semantics“ is all about.
6   Preliminary Conclusions
We collect now the most important results from the last two sections and relate
them to what we have said in the first two sections as to the underlying intention
of our enterprise. We will go backward for this, and take the last aspects first:
Hence, as the initial concept, the meaning of a process following its observation
shows up, especially with a view to classifying equivalent processes visualized as
operations on quantities which in turn classify transitions (between states of sy-
stems). This may be interpreted as the actual beginning of the process of scientific
research which is also the process of human reflexion (in particular: of reflecting
about nature). The formalization of this in terms of typed semantics (leading up to
the definition of quantaloids) means basically that reflexion has to rely on the ab-
stract mapping of its results, by including them within an algebraic (or topologi-
cal, or geometric) framework. Obviously, this is due to semiological conditions
which are boundary conditions for human reflexion. On the other hand, these
boundary conditions are self-imposed by the cognitive system of humans, because
they simply express the human capabilities of „working with“ what is perceived.
Hence, the close relationship between algebraic, topological, and geometric
structures on the one hand, and logic on the other. The relevance of Trifonov’s
work lies in the fact that it can be shown that formally, the actual choice of human
logic (for the practise of reflexions) is nothing but a product of the process which
is the object of research in terms of this very logic. The relevance of the work of
Abramsky and Vickers is to show that in terms of topos theory, this logic can be
explicitly related to the (mathematical) structures mentioned above. (And in fact,
for a quite generalized framework, because we would expect that typically, the
computer logic (of simulations e.g.) turns out to be different from human logic.)105
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Hence, categories, and especially topoi, provide a formalized (mathematical)
structure for computing purposes, for the modelling of processes, and for propo-
sitional structures (of modelling the modelling), at the same time. This is the chief
advantage of categories: that they make explicit the onto-epistemic character of
research (i.e. reflexion). Moreover, the intrinsic logic shows that observers who
interpret their world in a non-Boolean manner, are of generic type (or: may be
„more generic“ than Boolean observers).
Reverse the order of argument now: When we think of humans with a logic as
products of nature with a physics, then the choice of logic is actually an outcome
of the physical process, in first place, rather than something which is imposed
upon nature by some „external“ (or: independent) physical (human) observer.
This is a somewhat stronger rephrasing of Trifonov’s argument, in fact. The pro-
positional aspect as derived in the paper by Isham and Butterfield then, deals
mainly with the problem of mapping theory-languages onto each other: The point
is to actually discuss „translational“ aspects of semantics. It is important now to
notice the role of the composition rules: If they are path-independent operations
(acting on propositions), they refer to what Trifonov calls a rational paradigm of
logic. If however, they are path-dependent, they refer to a hermeneutic paradigm
instead.106 Hence, the latter can be referred to the production of excess meanings,
which are characteristic for „non-formalized“ situations.
This can also be discussed in more physical terms: In fact, for Vickers (though he
mentions this within another context), the category of sheaves is essentially a ge-
neralized universe of sets. In this sense, Trifonov speaks of „abstract worlds“
which are „universes of mathematical discourse“. But, on the other hand, given
any category C, the pre-sheaf on C is a contravariant functor F: C → Set. If, in
particular, C is the category of shapes, then the morphisms correspond to ways
the shapes can be glued together to give one shape (or to be more precise: there
are morphisms of the type f: x → y such that x can be included one way or the
other in y). Then a pre-sheaf on C can be thought of as a geometric structure built
by gluing together these shapes along their common pieces. (Similarly, a pre-
sheaf on the category of simplices turns out to be a „kind of space“.)107 Note that
there is a choice of configurations in a way, because when we introduce a special
pre-sheaf, the subobject classifier, then we actually deal with generating truth
values (in the sense of Isham and Butterfield). In particular, we can think of
TQFT as a pre-sheaf of Hilbert spaces on the category nCob whose morphisms
are n-dimensional cobordisms. Hence, TQFT is a Hilbert space object in the to-
pos of pre-sheaves on nCob. So, it is a quantum theory, because of it’s being a
Hilbert space object, while its peculiar variability (in assigning different Hilbert
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spaces to each (n-1)-dimensional manifold representing space) is due to it’s being
an object in a topos, because this property is expressing the aspect of intrinsic
motion ( = change/variation).
Hence, we can clearly recognize the close interrelationship between the physical
states and their representation in terms of „form“ (morphology) on the one hand,
and their logical conceptualization on the other. This does not actually mean
however, to explicitly derive logic from physics. But it may demonstrate (for a
start) both the intrinsic equivalence and the strict parallelism of the two, very
much in the sense of our modern re-interpretation of Spinoza’s original intention.
And there are many examples by now, which can illustrate the general tendency
of what is actually being done: Note e.g. Kauffman’s remarks on knot theory and
DNA, clearly displaying their semiological relevance.108 See also the work of Ca-
sati and Varzi who give an explicit history of discontinuities109 modelled accor-
ding to a parallel with macroscopic morphogenesis. Although the authors do not
refer to it, there is an obvious analogy with the perceptive and cognitive
processes which are at the basis of human reflexion, as Patricia Churchland has
discussed them.110 On the lowest (or highest, but in anyway most fundamental)
level then, we have spin foams which turn out to be equivalent to a „microscopic“
picture of an evolution operator acting on Hilbert spaces, determining transition
amplitudes of spin network states. Note the abstract character of this underlying
foundation of the world, from which physical structures and forms of matter are
eventually emerging (the human mind being one of them). Hence, the connotation
of substance. Note also that production means here differentiation rather: The
world can be visualized as a self-differentiation of the ground, gradually unfol-
ding the complete hierarchy of worldly structures.
In order to represent the hierarchy so achieved we take „really important“ catego-
ries and express them in terms of Chinese (!) characters: We start with the foun-
dation of all, given by the abstract structures of spin networks and spin foams, or,
alternatively, by Hilbert space operations, going forward to concrete cobordisms,
producing changes of topology, then to the geometric picture implying loops and
connections, and curvature (or forces) in the end. This is the physical level of
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worldly processes. At the same time, the fundamental level implies the level of
reflexion in terms of logic and hermeneutic, the latter being also produced in the
physical sense, but they themselves „acting back“ again on what produced them,
logic acting upon physics, in attempting to actually represent it, hermeneutic ac-
ting on logic and physics, respectively, in attempting to represent representations:
            →        x      →      y
                                         ↓↑
.              →                    g          →         p
                                         ↓↑
                       →               ;          →         *
                       ←                             ←
We start from the left-hand side with the foundation itself, which is pronounced
tchi ( . ) and means „ground“. The physical line of production is the upper one,
beginning with en (cycle) ( x ), and producing getsu (sickle moon = curvature)  (
y) and hence concrete physics in macroscopic terms. The physical structures
emerge from the left out of their foundation, but they themselves also produce one
of their forms which is rational mind (logic), expressed by bun (sen-
tence/proposition) ( g ). This in turn produces, through its spaces of free play,
excess meanings, and thus hermeneutic, expressed by wu’a (harmony)(; ). The
one produces knowledge laid down in various disciplines, expressed by gaku
(subject disciplines) ( p ). The other produces understanding and insight, ex-
pressed by dan (the rising sun) ( * ). It is the latter only which can act back onto
the ground ( = foundation).
Independent of this somewhat metaphorical representation of a systematic ap-
proach to what we call transcendental materialism (because of obvious reasons),
we may note that, in principle, what we have here is a category whose objects are
categories, and whose morphisms are functors. Recall that „the theory of catego-
ries“ itself is a category with finite limits whose models are categories. And in
this case, models are functors to Set preserving finite limits.111 If we could show
this for each of our categories, functors of this kind would be world models, ac-
tually representing (and expressing) the foundation of the world. The interesting
point is that part of the foundation itself (remember the spin foams) can be mo-
delled in terms of (mathematical) physics. But in so far this is a part of the foun-
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dation of the world rather than of the world itself, the physical theory associated
to it, is a foundational theory, in the sense that it precludes empirical confirmati-
on. (This is basically true for all conceptual theories of a unifying character.)
Hence, it is the formalized counterpart of speculative philosophy. Whilst empiri-
cal theories which are subject to experimental testing describe the physics within
the world. Unless they are not added to the foundational ingredients of a theory,
the latter is not testable. It is not its objective to be testable in fact, because it is
designed in order to represent worldly foundation. Hence, empirical theories are
the formalized counterpart of sceptical philosophy. This relationship is essentially
discussed here in terms of an analogy which draws its expressive potential from
the classical Spinozist relationship between substance and attribute. Although
today, we would not really think of Spinoza’s philosophy as a solution to our pre-
sent problems, it proves nevertheless useful to actually re-construct the latter
within the context of a modernized version of the general framework Spinoza’s
theory laid down as a guideline for further orientation. This is in fact, what philo-
sophy is all about. And in this sense, philosophy might have its own (heuristic)
merits.
Dedication
This work is dedicated to the memory of Alexandros Chapsiadis.
„O gebt euch der Natur, eh’ sie euch nimmt.“112 (F.Hoelderlin)
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